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hand, which is our standard practice. And then perhaps we l,vould
have avoided some of the inconvenience.
But more than anything, I will remind the minority member that
the majority has every right to invite or not invite anybody that
they want to. And I would appreciate your supporting a majority
witness, but in this case, we were simply exercismg the rights that
we already have.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the interests of fairness and due process and all of the values
that the House Judiciary Committee portends to protect, I respect
the response of the chairman only to say that laymen who typically
are not proficient at testifying before committees may have any
number of reasons to delay or have delayed testimony. In fact, I
have been before many witnesses whose testimony appeared on my
desk right as they began to speak.
I would only indicate and say that I would rather another penalty for individuals as opposed to denial of testimony, because we
have every right to cross-examine their testimony if it was not in
the keeping and liking of any of us who might have invited them.
I only ask again for that, and I appreciate the fact that you have
given a response,
'
Mr. SMITH. Thank you.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman.
Mr. SMITH. We will welcome our third panel today, consisting of
Professor David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center; and
Mrs. Nahla AI-Arian, a relative of an affected individual who is
being held-in detention.
We welcome you both, and Professor Cole, if you will begin by
giving us your testimony.
I

STATEMENT OF DAVID COLE, PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER

Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for
holding this hearing and for inviting me to testifY.
We heard a lot in the prior panel about national security and
threats to national security. And of course, when the FBI General
Counsel gets up and talks about threats to national security, it is
very hard for us to question that. And when questions are raised,
and he says, well, I am not at liberty to talk about specific cases,
it gets more difficult to challenge the claim.
But I think the claim can be challenged, and I am here to do
that. First, I want to look at what Mr. Alexander's testimony basically was, which is, despite the broad authority that you have given
us, or that we have interpreted you to give us, we in fact only use
this procedure where there are true threats to national security,
where the alien poses a true threat to national security.
.
In other words, trust us. You give us this big authority, but we
will only use it in narrow cases.
But then he says, there are 12 currently pending cases in which
aliens pose a true threat to national security. It has been determined at the highest levels that they pose a true threat to national
security.
'
But then he also tells us that only five of those aliens are being
detained by INS. So INS, in the highest levels of justice, has de-
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cided that seven aliens pose a true threat to national security, and
nonetheless are free and at large in this country. Now, if they really posed a threat to national necurity, would the INS be allowing
them out, free, at large? No, they would be detained.
So I think that, just from the current pending cases, suggests
some reason to question what they say.
Now, I want to talk about the past a little bit. I have represented
, 13 people in the last 13 years against whom the INS has sought
to use secret evidence. And the INS' track record in these cases belies Mr. Parkinson's general assurances that this power will be
used only for true threats to national security.
That was the argument that the INS made in all 13 cases at one
time. They were all alleged to be threats to national security. Yet
in no case did the secret evidence charge that any of these individuals engaged in or supported any criminal conduct, much less
criminal conduct that would threaten national security. In every
case, the basic charge was guilt by association.
Twelve of those 13 people who the INS said posed direct threats
to national security are now living freely and peaceably in the
United States, without, as far as I can tell, any undermining of the
national security. The thirteenth case is still pending, and Mrs. AlArian will talk about that.
In every case that has reached a resolution, the INS has lost: In
the three cases that reached Federal court resolution, Federal
courts have declared the use of secret evidence unconstitutional,
and the INS has basically chosen not to pursue its appeals. The
only appeal it has chosen to pursue is with respect to Mr.
Kiareldeen, and there the only argument it is making on appeal is
that the case should be dismissed as moot, because Mr. Kiareldeen
is now released, not that the underlying decisio~ was wrong.
Yet it continues to engage in the practice. In all the cases that
did not reach Federal court, immigration judges ruled against the
INS, rejecting claims that national security was in fact at stake,
after considering the evidence. Now, it is a rare thing, as you know,
for a judge to stand up to a Federal Government claim of national
security. The fact that judges have done so in so many cases reflects both the due process concerns that this practice raises and
the Government's failure to reserve the tool for the most egregious
cases.
.
In my written statement, I have illustrated in detail the dangers
of secret 'evidence by talking about these specific cases. Here I just
want to touch on some of the most fundamental problf'Tl'ls, first by
focusing on a single case, Nassar Ahmed. Put yourself ~;J the shoes
of Nassar Ahmed, an Egyptian citizen living here for 10 years with
three U.S. citizen children, put in deportation pro~eedings because
he overstayed his visa.
But he has a strong case for asylum because he faces persecution
if returned to Egypt. He shows up for a routine immigration hearing and he is suddenly taken into custody, told he is a threat to
national security. He says, why? The INS says, we can't tell you,
because disclosing anything, even summarizing the charges against
you, would itself jeopardize national security.
How do you defend yourself? In an ordinary immigration case, he
would have the right to know the charges against him. In these

43
proc~edin.gs, he had no right even to a summary. In an ordinary
1ll)ougratlOn case, he would have the right to cross-examine witnesse~. In secret evidence proceedings, you don't even know who
the WItnesses are, much less can you cross-examine them. And indee~, the Government declined even to tell the immigration judge
behin~ closed ~oors who the. witnesses we.re, and declined to bring
the WItnesses In to be questIoned by the Judge. They said, rely on
our FBI agent's summary of what they have said.
In an ordinary immigration case, you have the right to object to
the admission of evidence. Well, how c(,n you object to the admission of evidence when it is being submitted behind closed doors?
In short, secret evidence short-circuits the adversary process.
That is why three Federal courts, the only three Federal courts
that have addressed this issue in the last decade, and I represented
the aliens in all those cases, have declared that the use of secret
_
evidence is unconstitutional.
Mr. Alexander said, aliens don't have a full panoply of due pmcess rights, and citizens do, as if there is kind of a deluxe version
of due _process rights, and then a basic version of due process
rights. Well, there is no case that supports that proposition. But
even if there were, what right could be more basic under due process than the right to see the evidence against you?
Now, beyond the basic, general problems with the use of secret
evidence that the courts have recognized, I want to talk about the
articular problems raised by the way the INS has used this. And
Ywant to particularly respond to the assurances you have had
about how they engaged in very careful review.
First of all, there is no requirement in the law that this practice
be reserved for persons who truly threaten national security. The
only requirement in the law is that the information be classified,
and of course, you know, millions of pages of information are classified every day, and that the information be relevant to the immigration proceeding. Not that it shows that the alien is a thceat to
national security, but merely that it be relevant. They can use it
any time it is relevant. They have used it in cases where the INS's
own actions indicate no threat to national security.
In one of the earliest cases I did, the case of the Los Angeles
Eight, in 1987, the INS sought to detain eight immigrants on secret evidence at the same time than then-FBI Director William
Webster was testifying before this Congress that the FBI had determined that none of the individuals had engaged in any criminal
or terrorist activity whatsoever, that they were arrested solely for
their political affiliations and that if they were U.S. citizens, there
would be no grounds for their arrest. .
Moreover, in all 12 of the cases in which the INS has lost and
we have prevailed and the aliens have been freed, the Government
has declined to pursue all of its appeals. Now, if a true threat to
national security were presented, wouldn't you expect the INS to
pursue all of its appeals? But instead, it has repeatedly dropped
the case, allowed the alien who it was claiming posed a threat to
national security to be released into the community and not even
taken all the steps that it could take.
.
Secondly, summaries. There is no requirement under the law
that a summary be provided. There is also no requirement that if

...

__
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a summary be provided that it be meaningful. When Mr. Ahmed
was first detained, he received no summary whatsoever. At a later
point in his hearing, the INS used secret evidence again. The only
summary they would give him then was, you are associated with
a known terrorist org.qnization. They wouldn't even tell him the
group.
Now, how do you defend yourself against that? When we filed a
constitutional challenge, all of a sudden the INS found itself able
to disclose the name of the group and 50 pages of previously classified information.
And that brings me to the third point. The INS often uses this
procedure where the evidenCE> does not need to be kept secret, because it was improperly classified. The Iraqi Six, represented by
former CIA Director, Jim Woolsey. Initially, the Government said
they had to be kept out because they were threats to national security and all the evidence against them was secret. Well, then Jim
Woolsey took the case, came here, brought a lot of attention to it,
went on 60 Minutes, and all of a sudden, the INS was able to dis- .
close 500 pages of what it previously said could not possibly be disclosed without threatening and jeopardizing national security. In
Mr. Ahmed's case, the same thing happened.
'
Fourth, this ability to use secret evidence leads the INS to rely
on very questionable evidence. In Mr. Kiareldeen's case, which we
have heard aboyt, and he is here, once a threat to national security, now sitting right here, because the INS did not deem him a
serious enough threat to pursue its appeals, even though it deemed
him a serious enough threat to hold him in jail on the basis of secret evidence for 19 months.
In his case, the evidence primarily came from his ex-wife who
was in a custody dispute with him, who it was established had
made repeated - .
Mr. SMITH. Professor Cole, I am going to interrupt you for a
minute. We have been generous with other witnesses this morning
and let them go a minute or so past the customary 5 minute limit.
You are almost doubling that limit.
Mr. COLE. Well, if I could just conclude.
Mr. SMITH. Please, thank you.
Mr. COLE. Just one other example of questionable evidence. In
the Nassar Ahmed case, one of the arguments that the FBI agent
made behind closed doors, and which was classified as secret, was
that because the INS had imprisoned Mr. Ahmed, it had increased
his stature in the community and therefore he should not be released.
The strongest argument against the use of secret evidence is that
it is fundamentally·unfair. But it is also unnecessary. We can't do
it in criminal proceedings, and aU the references to CIPA previously I think were quite misleading. CIPA does not permit introduction of secret evidence in criminal proceedings. It couldn't, because of the sixth amendment.
No matter how serious the crime is, we can't do it. And we have
survived as a Nation for <:> 3 years, and I think we are better for
it, for having honored the basic right to see the evidence against_
us. We can continue to survive honoring that right.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:]
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PREPARED STATEM_~NT OF DAVID COLE.J. PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAw
vENTER
INTRODUCTION -

Mr. Chairman, me~bers of the Committee, I thank you for inviting me to testify
on the use. of secr~t evi~ence i';l ~gration proceedings.! I have an unfortunately _.
long expenence WIth this practIce. Smce 1987, I have represented 13 aliens against
whom the INS has sought to use secret evidence. At one time, the INS claimed that
all 13 posed a direct threat to the security of the nation, and that the evidence to
support ~hat a<tljertion .could ~o~ be re~ealed-in !Dany ~tances could not even be
summanzed - WIthout Jeopardizmg natlOnal secunty .. Yet m none of these cases did
the INS's secret evidfJDC6 even allege, much less provp., that the aliens had engaged
in or sUJ'ported II:ny criminal. much less terrorist. activity. In most cases. the ~ov
emment s allegatIons. once revealed, consisted of no more than guilt by association:
it claimed that the aliens were associated with disfavored "terrorist" groups. but not
that they actually engaged in or furthered any terrorist activity themselves.
Today, one of the 13 remains in prison as his case is still pending. All the other
clients are free. living a law-abiding and peaceable existence here in the United
States. without any adverse consequences to the security of the nation. In every case
that has reached a final determination. the INS has lost. Where the caE'es have been
resolved in the federal courts. the courts have declared the use of secret evidenr.e
unconstitutional. Where the cases have been resolved in the immigration process
immigration judges have uniformly rejected the government's national securitY
claims as unwarranted.
In the meantime. however. substantial harm has been done. Nasser Ahmed. an
Egyptian man living in New Yl'rk, spent 3 and 0 years of his life incarcerated. most
of it in solitary confinement. before his release last November. when the Attorney
General declined to overrule the Board of Immigration Appeals' ruling that he did
not pose a threat to national security and should be released. Hany Kiareldeen. a
Palestinian from New Jersey/ .spent a year and a half in detention before the BIA
and a federal Court ordered nis release in October 1999. And Mazen Al Najjar. a
Palestinian from Tampa. Florida whose case is still pending. this week will pass his
l000th day in captivity. without criminal charges and on the basis of evidence he
has never seen.
But it is not simply years of human beings' lives that have been lost. More broadly. America's image as a country that cares about fairness. openness. and dutl process has been seriously tarnished. Secret evidence is a tactic one associates with totalitarian regimes and military juntas. not free democracies. A remedy is needed,
and H.R. 2121 is it.
. .
The use of secret evidence poses insuperable challenges to the administration of
justice. First, and most fundamentally, it is simply not possible to hold a fair adversary proceeding where one side presents its eVIdence behind closed doors. The adversary process is the best mechanism for detennining the truth that we have yet
identified. but it depends on each side being able to examine and respond to the
- other's evidence. Accordingly, every court to address ~he use of secret evidence in
immigration proceedings in the last decade has declared it unconstitutional.
Second. the INS's use of secret evidence contains practically no safeguards against
abuse. It uses secret evidence against ~ple who do not pose any threat to the nationaJ security. because in its view eVIdence can be submitted behind dosed doors
whenever it is classified and relevant, even if the individual involved does not him·
self pose a threat to national security. It uses secret evidence where there is no legitimate need for the evidence to be secret. because it has been improperly classified
by another at::ency and the INS has no authority to declassify. It uses secret evidence where It has no affinnative statutory authority to do so. such as in detaining
aliens without bond. It has failed to keep any record of many _of its secret evidence
presentations, thereby defeating meaningful review. And while the INS has occasionally provided aliens with declassified summaries of its secret eVIdence. neither
statute nor regulation requires such a production. nor that the sunmtary provided
afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond. Accordingly. summaries are
often not provided at all. and when provided, are often so general as to be entirely
unhelpful.
1 I speak here in my personal capacity. and not as a representative of Georgetown University
Law Center or any other entity or person. I attach my curriculum vitae as Exhibit A. Pursuant
to House Rule XI. clause 2(g)(4), I hereby disclose that in the past three yeartl I received a $2500
honorarium for speaking at a Justice Department conference. and $300 each year from the Administrative Office for U.S. Court3 for conducting an /Ulnual training session for U.S. magistrates.
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Third, reliance on secret -evidence that cannot be challenged by one's adversarIes
leads the government to engage in sloppy practices that would never be tolerated
were it required to make its case in open court. Ai!, far as I can determine, the INS
has relied almost entirely on hearsay presentations by FBI agents, and has failed
t.o produce any original declarants, even in the closed-door proceedings. The FBI
agents' presentations have sometimes taken the form of barebones assertions, not
even providing the judge with sufficient information to make an independent assessment of the reliability of or basis for the allegations. And the INS and FBI have
relied on innuendo and rumor, even where its own records raise serious questions
about the validity of its charges.
Fourth, there has never been any showing that the use of secret evidence is necessary. In no other setting is the government permitted to deprive someone of his
liberty without affording him a meaningful opportunity to respond to the evidence
against him. In criminal cases, secret evidence is never permitted, no matter how
serious the charges, and no matter how much confidential or classified information
the government has implicating the defendant. This rule applies to the prosecution
of terrorists, spies, and mass murderers. We have survived as a nation for over 200
years abiding by that basic rule of due process. There is no reason we cannot and
should not extend the same rule to immigrants when we seek to deprive them of
their liberty and either imprison them or deport them.
Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive. It poisons the truth-finding process, so we cannot even be certain of whether we have properly identified
threats to national security. It embroils the government in protracted litigation because the adversary process is ill-suited to this practice. And most problematically,
. it encourages cynicism, paranoia, and distrust in immigrant communities, because
closed-door proceedings understandably make people fear the worst. That paranoia
and distrust in turn impedes the ability of law enforcement to identify true threats
in immigrant communities, because it means that the FBI and INS will be viewed
as enp-my rather than protector.
I support H.R. 2121 because it seeks to end this practice. It would repeal existing
statutory aut~ority for the use of secret evidence to deport aliens, to deny them relief from depoltation, or to detain them. Its premise is that the practice cannot be
mended, and therefore should simply be ended. I agree with that premise, because
at bottom the use of secret evi-:lpl"!~:) cannot be ~quared with the due process guarantee of notice and a fair hearing. In this testimon~', I will show why that is so as
a matter of constitutiQnal law and i~lustrate "::lY it in so by pointing to the INS's
dismal track record in secret evidence cas"".
I. A CASE STUDY

/

I want to begin with a case study. Hany Kiareldeen is a thirty-one year old Palestinian who came to the United States on a student visa in 1990 and lives in Newark, New Jersey. From March 1998 to October 1999, he spent 19 months in prison
solely on the basis of secret evidence-an uncorroborated bare-bones hearsay report-that neither he nor his lawyers ever have had an opportunity to see.
In 1997, Kiareldeen applied for adjustment of status to permanent resident based
on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. On March 26, 1998, however, without ruling on
his application for permanent resident status, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, charged
him with being deportable for failing to maintain his student visa status, and took
him into custody as a threat to national security.
Kiareldeen has never seen the only evidence that the INS ever offered to justify
his detention, because the INS presented it in camera and ex parte. According to
the undisputed claims of the immigration judges who reviewed it, however, the secret evidence consisted of a report prepared by an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force
relaying extremely general hearsay allegations. Declassified summaries of the evidence provided to Kiareldeen disclosed three allegations: (1) that Kiareldeen was'lSsociated with an unidentified "terrorist organization," and "maintains relationships"
with other members and "suspected members" of "terrorist organizations," also unidentified; (2) that '"[an unidentified] source advised" that about a week before the
World Trade Center ("WTC") bombin~, Kiareldeen hosted a meeting at his residence
in Nutley, New Jersey, where some mdividuals discussed plans to bomb the World
Trade Center; and (3) that "[an unidentified] source advised Kiareldeen expressed
a desire to murder Attorney General Janet Reno." The INS never introduced any
evidence in open court to substantiate any of these allegations. Kiareldeen v. Reno,
1999 WL 956289, *15 CD.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999).
The immigration judge handling Kiareldeen's case initially ruled, in May 1997,
that the government's secret evidence justified his detention as a security threat.
At that time, the INS told Kiareldeen only that the evidence showed that he was
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associated with terrorists and posed a threat to the Attorney General, charges so'
general that he could not possibly rebut them.
After Kiareldeen obtained more detailed summaries of the evidence, he did rebut
t~fJ ~o"ernment's case in open court. He proved, for example, that he did not even
hve ill the apartment where he supposedly met with World Trade Center bombers
until a year and a half after the alleged meeting took place. (The FBI's own records
confirmed this fact.) He also showed that one of the sources of secret evidence
against him, his ex-wife, had made numerous false allegations against him in the
course of a custody battle over their child. Kiareldeen sought to examine his ex-wife
in open court, but the INS vigorously opposed his attempts to do so, and she refused
to testify about her discussions with the FBI.
Seven immigration judges ultimately examined Kiareldeen's case on the complete
record, including the government's secret evidence presentation and Kiareldeen's
open court rebuttal-the judge whu conducted the immigration hearing and two separate three-judge panels of the Board of Immigration Appeals. It is rare for any
judge-even an Article III judge-to reject to a claim of national security by the federal government. Yet in this case, all seven judges flatly rejected the government's
contention that Kiareldeen posed a threat to national security.
Two judges directly discussed the quality of the government's evidence. The Immigration Judge who presided at trial, Daniel Meisner, stated that Kiareldeen had
"raised formidable doubts about the veracity of the· allegations contained in the
[classified informationl," and that in the face of repeated requests for more information, the INS had refused "to answer those doubts with any additional evidence, be
it at the public portion of the hearing or even in camera." Matter of Kiareldeen,
A77-025-332, Decision of Immigration Judge (Apr. 2, 1999). He concluded that the
classified evidence was "too meager to provide reasonable grounds to believe that
[Kiareldeenl was actually involved in any terrorist activity." [d.
BIA Judge Anthony Moscato, dissenting from a preliminary bond panel decision
not to release Kiareldeen, wrote that the bare-bones character of the government's
in camera evidence made it "impossible" for the BIA to exercise independent judgment in assessing "either the absolute truth or the relative probity of the evidence
cC'ita;ned in the classified information." Matter of Kiareldeen, A77-025-332, Decision of BIA Denying Request to Lift Stay of Release Order (June 29, 1999) (Moscato,
J., dissenting). Judge- Moscato criticized the INS for having provided no original
source material and "little in the way of specifics regarding the source or context
of the classified information." [d. He further noted that despite the immigration
judge's continuing requests, the INS had provided "no witnesses, neither confidential informant nor federal agent, to explain or document the context of the actions
and statements referenced in the classified information or to document the way in
which the classified information became known to the source of that information."
[d. at 1-2.2
On August 18, 1999, Kiareldeen filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district
court in New Jersey, arguing that the use of secret evidence to deprive him of his
liberty pending resolution of the deportation proceedings was both unauthorized by
statute and unconstitutional. On October 20, 1999, the district court granted the petition and issued a writ of habeas corpus. The court ruled that the INS's reliance
on secret evidence violated Kiareldeen's due process right to a fair hearing, finding
that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious issues about the integrity of the adversarial proceSf, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges, and
the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted in darkness."
Kiareldeen v. Reno, 1999 WL 956289, "'11 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999). The court also
ruled that Kiareldeen had been deprived of his due process rights because the secret
evidence at issue consisted of uncorroborated hearsay that "could not be tested for
reliability" and did not allow the immigration judges "to conduct a meaningful administrative review." [d. at "'14-18. The court ordered Kiareldeen'fl immediate release.
Later the same day, a three-judge bond panel of the BIA also ordered Kiareldeen's
release, unanimously rejecting the INS's appeal of the immigration judge's decision
to grant bond, and lifting its prior preliminary stay of Kiareldeen's release. Five
days earlier, on October 15, 1999, a separate three-judge merits panel had unanimously affirmed t11e immigration judge's decision granting Kiareldeen permanent
2 The other two judges on this panel declined to lift the stay of Kiareldeen's release order
pending appeal, but did not dispute in any respect Judge Moscato's characterization of the evidence.
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resident status, also finding that Kiareldeen had successfully rebutted the INS's
charges against him. a
After obtaining temporary stays of Kiareldeen's release from the Attorney General
and a Third Circuit judge, the INS decided, on October 25, 1999, not to pursue further appeals ~vailable to it, and released Kiareldeen. The .INS apparently concluded,
after contendmg for more than a year and a half that Kiareldeen posed a national
security threat, that he did not even pose a sufficient threat to justify pursuing its
appeals. Kiareldeen is now a permanent resident alien) but has never received even
an apology from the INS for taking a year and a half or his liberty from him.
Kiareldeen's case is just one of many stories that could be told. I will now turn
to the range of legal and practical problems raised by the INS's use of secret evidence.

n. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
The use of secret evidence denies an alien the most basic guarantees of due process: notice of the evidence against him and a meaningful opportunity to rebut it.
. Accordingly, every court to address the issue in the last decade has found this practice unconstitutional. 4
As the Supreme Court has stated:
Certain prinl'iples have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual,
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings t the evidence used
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the inaividual
so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 496. "'Fairness can rarely be obtained i:ly secret, onesided determination of facts decisive of rights.'" Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580
(1975) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170
(1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
Accordingly, even in ordinary civil litigation where physical liberty is not at stake,
"it is . .'. the firmly held malO rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of
a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions." Abourezk v. Reagan, 785
F.2d 1043, 1061 CD.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); see also Kinoy v. Mitchell,
67 F.R.D. I, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to grant summary judgment on the basis
of materials submitted in camera, because "[oJur system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil liti~dtion"). "[T]he very
foundatIOn of the adversary process assumes that use of undIsclosed information
will violate due process," and therefore "use of undisclosed information in adjudications should be presumptively unconstitutional." American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee v. Reno, (ADC v. Reno), 70 F.3d 1045, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1995).5
Applying these principles, a federal district court recently declared unconstitutional the use of secret evidence to detain aliens without bond. In Kiareldeen v.
Reno, 1999 WL 956289 CD.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999), the district court granted habeas corpus relief to an alien who had been detained by INS on the basis of secret evidence
allegedly demonstrating that he was a threat to national security. As noted above,
the court found that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious doubts about the integrity of the adversarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges, and the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted
in darkness." [d. at *11.
3 Under the BINs rules, separate panels consider appeals of bond determinations and appeals
of the merits of deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §3.19(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1226; Gornika v. INS, 681
F.2d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 1982).
4 The Due Process Clause protects all persons living in this country, whether citizen or alien.
It protects even aliens living here unlawfuJly:
There are IiteraJly millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from
deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose presence in
this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Leng
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (958) ("our immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who
are within the United States after an entl{', irrespective of its legality."); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ("since he is a 'person, an alien has the same ,Rrotection for his life, liberty
and property under the Due Process Clause as is afforded a citizen. ).
6 A later decision in ADe v. Reno, addressing a separate selective prosecution claim, was reversed and vacated by the Supreme Court under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Reno v. American·Nab Anti·Discrimination Comm.,
U.S. __ ,
119 S. Ct. 936 (1999), but that decision had no bearing on the 1995 decision's hOlding on the
use of secret evidence.
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The Court in Kiareldeen followed the two most recent federal appellate court decisions reviewing INS attempts to use secret evidence in immigration proceedings,
both of which also held the/ractice unconstitutional. In 1988, the INS asserted national security concerns an sought to rely on secret evidence of Fouad Rafeedie's
alleged high-ranking membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an allegedly terrorist group, to exclude him from the country upon
his return from a trip abroad. A district court preliminarily enjoined the INS's actions on due process grounds, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the injunction. Rafeedie
v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment and held that the INS's attempt to rely on secret evidence violated due process. Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. SUfP. 13 (D.D.C. 1992). The INS chose not to appeal,
and abandoned its effort to expe Rafeedie.
In Rafeedie, every judge to review the INS's actions found "'the government's
basic position . . . profoundly troubling.''' Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525 (Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, J., concurring). The district court found that such a procedure "afford[sl
virtually none of the procedural protections designed to minimize the risk that the
government may err.' Rafeedie, 795 F. Supp. at 19. The court of app~als compared
the position of an alien having to disprove charges based on secret information to
that of Joseph K. in Franz Kafka's The Trial, and stated that ''lilt is difficult to
imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden."
Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 516.
in 1995, the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that the INS could not constitutionally rely on undisclosed information to deny legalization, an immigration benefit, to two aliens accused of associating with a terrorist organization. ADC v. Reno,
70 F.3d at 1066-71. The Ninth Circuit held that "[olnly the most extraordinary circumstances could support one-sided process." Id. at 1070. The fact that the government asserted national security and charged aliens with membership in a terrorist
organization was not sufficient to justify reliance on secret evidence. [d. Again, the
government chose not to pursue further appeals, and granted the aliens legalization.
These cases in turn followed Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953),
in which the Supreme Court relied on due process concerns to interpret an INS regulation not to permit the use of secret evidence to exclude aliens who live here and
have due process protections. Chew was a lawful permanent resident of the United
States who had left the country for four months as a seaman on a merchant vessel.
Upon his return, he was threatened with permanent exclusion based on an immigration regulation that allowed the exclusion of aliens on the basis of confidential
information without a hearing. To avoid a "constitutional conflict" with the Due
Process Clause, the Supreme Court construed the regulation not to apply to returning lawful resident aliens, who have due process rights. Id. at 600-03.
.
These cases establish a simple propOSItion: the use of secret evidence cannot be
squared with due process. It makes a mockery of the adversary process. Ordinarily,
aliens have a right to confront all the evidence against them, and to cross-examine
the government's witnesses. In secret evidence proceedings, the alien cannot crossexamine, and often has no idea even of what the charges against him are. Ordinarily, aliens can object to the introduction of evidence in immigration proceedings;
where evidence is produced in secret, the alien cannot make any objections, because
he cannot know what the evidence consists of. Ordinarily, an alien is provided with
notice of the ch.a~ges agains~ him; in a ~ecret evidence proceeding he is not. In short,
all of the reqUISItes of' a faIr adversanal process are abandoned when the government is free to introduce its evidence behind closed doors.
The government generally cites three cases in arguing that it is constitutional to
use secret evidence in deportation proceedings. None provides the supPort the government seeks. The first, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), expressly disclaimed any
constitutional holding. The case presented only a statutory challenge to the use of
secret evidence to deny suspension of deportation as a matter of discretion, and the
Court expressly noted that the alien had presented no constitutional challenge. Jay,
351 U.S. at 357 n.21. Quite plainly, a case that does not even present a constitutional claim cannot resolve that claim. The other two cases the government cites,
from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, engage in virtually no constitutional analysis.
They each dismiss the due process issue in a paragraph by misreading Jay v. Boyd
as if it decided the constitutional issue, wholly disregarding the fact that the Court
in Jay explicitly said it was not deciding that issue. s
6United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Suciu v. INS, 755 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1985). Indeed, the court in Suciu
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Ill. THE INS'S USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS DEVOID OF MEANINGFUL SAFEGUARDS

The basic due process problem with relying on secret evidence is exacerbated by
the fact that the INS's regulations and procedures contain no meaningful safeguards
against its abuse. And as the INS's track record illustrates, the abuses have been
endemic.
A. The Use of Secret Evidence is Not Restricted to Individuals Posing a Threat to
National Security
First, the INS does -not limit its use of secret evidence to national security risks.
Its regulations permit it to use this extraordinary procedure anytime that it has
classified evidence relevant to an application for an immigration benefit. If the INS
had classified evidence that an indiVIdual's marriage was not bona fide, for example,
an issue that in itself poses no security concern, its regulations would nonetheless
permit it to present that evidence behind closed doors. There is no requirement that
It first attempt to make its case without relying on secret evidence. And most problematically, there is no requirement that it limit its use of this procedure to individuals who truly pose a threat to national security, such as, for example, individuals
who have committed or were planning to commit criminal conduct threatening national security.
\
Accordingly, the INS used secret evidence in 1997 to oppose Imad Hamad's application for permanent resident status, even though its evidence (which it subsequently disclosed because it was improperly classified), showed no more than that
Hamad had attended a Palestinian dinner/dance, on the basis of which the INS argued that he was associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation -of Palestine.
Both an immigration judge and the BIA held that this evidence did not support denying Mr. Hamad adjustment of statushand the INS did not pursue further appeals.
Mr. Hamad now lives in Dearborn, Mic igan.
More frequently, the INS maintains that individuals pose a threat to national security when the INS's own subsequent actions make clear that the evidence simply
does not support the charge. Thus, in 1987, the INS arrested eight aliens in Los
Angeles, charged them as deportable for being members of a group that advocated
world communism, and sought to detain them as national security threats on secret
evidence. When the immigration judge refused to take evidence in camera and ex
parte, the INS simply allowed the eight to go free, belying its national security
claims. At the same time, then-FBI Director William Webster testified that an FBI
investigation had found no evidence of terrorist or criminal ~onduct on the part of
any of the eight, that they were arrested for their political affiliations with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and that if they had been U.S.
citizens, there would have been no basis for their alTest. 7 Thus, in this case the government sought to use secret evidence at the same time that it admitted that the
individuals had engaged in no criminal or terrorist activity. Later in the same case,
the INS again tried to use secret evidence to deny two of the eight aliens legalization under an amnesty law. The district court examined the evidence i1l camera and
found that it demonstrated nothing other than First Amendment-protected activities. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, ]069-70 (9th
Cir. 1995) (discussing district court finding and noting that the government's claims
of national security were premised not on any individual conduct but on general assertions about the PFLP).
_
Similarly, the INS initially claimed that Fouad Rafeedie posed a threat to national security because he was a high-ranking member of the PFLP, it allowed him
to remain free on parole, thus undermining its own claims. And when a district
court granted summary judgment against the INS and held both its use of secret
evidence and a provision of the INA unconstitutional, the government did not pursue further appeals, even though there is a strong presumption in favor of appealing
decisions declaring statutes unconstitutionaL Mr. Rafeedie now lives a peaceful and
law-abiding existence in Texas.
Imad Hamad, yet another man accused of posing a national security threat, is
also a permanent reside'lt today. A Palestinian living in Michigan, he was also
charged with being associated with the PFLP, again on the basis of secret evidence.
The immigration judge reviewed the evidence, but found nothing in it that waracknowledged that "as a matter of fairness and logic, the [due process} argument has considerable appeal," but then erroneously considered it "foreclosed" by Jay v. Boyd. [d.
7 Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Nomination of William
H. Wt'bster, to be Director of Central Intelligence, 100th Cong., 1st Se~s. 94, 95 (April 8, 9, 30,
1987; May 1, 1987), quoted in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045,
1053 (9th Cir. 1995).
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ranted denying Hamad's application for permanent resident status. On appeal, the
BlA affirmed, and the INS did not seek further review by the Attorney General.
As detailed above, the INS never charged Hany Kiareldeen with any criminal activitr despite claiming that he posed a threat to national security. All seven judges
to VIew the complete record in his case found no basis for the government's claim
that he posed a national security threat, and the INS then declined to pursue its
appeals Nasser Ahmed spent 3 and 1/2 years detained, ostensibly as a threat to national security.
When an immigration judge and the BlA both ruled in 1999 that Nasser Ahmed
an Egyptian man who had been imprisoned for 3 and 1/2 years, should be released
because the INS's evidence did not show that he posed a threat to national security,
the INS initially sought Attorney General review. At the eleventh hour, however,
minutes before the deadline the Attorney General set for herself to decide whether
Ahmed should go free or continue to be detained, the INS withdrew its request for
Attorney General review. Quite. plainly, the Attorney General was not convinced
that Ahmed actually posed a national security threat.
The only person I represent who is still detained on the basis of secret evidence
is Mazen Al N!\i.:iar. We have just filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf, and
the case is still being briefed. But in his case, too, there are strong reasons to doubt
the government's claims of national security. First, AI N!\i.:iar remained a free man
until his deportation hearing concluded, yet the INS has never explained why he
became a threat to national security only after the hearing was complete. He has
been the subject of grand jury investigations since at least January 1996, yet the
government has filed no cnminal charges against him or those with whom he is associated. And the only reason that either the immigration judge or the BlA gave
for detaining him as a national security threat was his alleged political association
with a terrorist group-neither the immigration judge, the BlA, nor the INS itself
has ever claimed that Al Najjar himself engaged in or supported any terrorist activity. Matter of Ai Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of Immigration Judge 6 (June
23, 1997); Matter Of AI Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of BIA 12 (Sept. 15,
1998).
It is my view that the use of secret evidence to deprive an individual of his liberty
or to acljudicate an alien's request to remain here is nearly always unconstitutional.
But even if one believed that it could be used in extreme cases posing extreme dangers, the INS regulations do not restrict it to such cases. On the contrary, the INS
has repeatedly used secret evidence even where it lacks sufficient evidence to charge
any cnminal conduct, much less criminal conduct threatening national security.
B. The INS Often Uses Improperly Classified Evidence, and Only Declassifies it
When Its Actions are Challenged
Whatever one thinks of the validity of secret procedures where evidence is properly classified, we can.all agree that there is no justification for the procedure where
evidence does not in fact need to be confidential. Yet the INS has repeatedly rresented evidence in camera and ex parte that could and should have been disclosed
from the outset. This is more the fault of the FBI, vi'.jch is generally the classifying
agency, than the INS, but it is a critical problem wil .! 'lITent practices.
For example, in 1998, the INS initially relied on s,.,·~t evidence to exclude several
Iraqis who were accused of being double-agents after the United States airlifted
them from Iraq on the heels of a failed coup atteJUpt against Saddam Hussein.
When fonner Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey took their case on and
brought substantial congressional and media pressure to bear on the INS, the government found that it was suddenly able to declassify over 500 pages of the previously secret evidence.
Similarly, in Nasser Ahmed's case, the government initially took the position that
it could not even provide a summary of any the secret evidence against him without
jeopardizintr the national security. Yet when Ahmed filed a constitutional challenge
to the INS s actions, it suddenly found itself able to provide a summary of many
of its charges, and it eventually turned over more than 50 pages of declassified material that had originally been submitted in secret. The fact that the INS was able
to disclose the evidence indicates that there was no need to submit it in secret in
the first place. Moreover, on its face much of the evidence could not possibly have
been properly classified. One allegation, for example, maintained that Ahmed was
associated with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, but that was hardly a secret, as
Ahmed had served as Sheikh Abdel Rahman's court-appointed paralegal and translator during the criminal trial of the Sheikh. Other evidence initially classified but
ultimately disclosed revealed that the INS's witness in the in camera proceedings,
an FBI agent, argued that Ahmed shovld be detained because his detention by INS
had made him a hero in the Muslim community and his release would increase hiB
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political stature. Matter of Ahmed, Decision of Immigration Judge and Declassified
Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999).
In still another case, that of Imad Hamad, it turned out that the "secret evidence"
that the INS presented at Mr. Hamad's hearing in 199'/ had previously been produced publicly and disclosed to the alien at an earlier stage of the proceeding. When
the INS learned of this, it "declassified" the document and submitted it as part of
the open record when the case was on appeal to the BIA. Quite plainly, the document never should have been classified.
These cases illustrate an inherent structural problem. The evidence that the INS
generally presents in secret is not classified by it, but by another agency, usually
the FBI. If the FBI overclassifies, as it apparently did in the cases described above,
the INS has no authority to second-guess the FBI's judgment. Nor does the immigration judge. Moreover, when an FBI agent makes a decision to classifY, it is usually in the context of a counterterrorism investigation, where he is effectively weighing an abstract public right to know against the need for confidentiality of an investigation. In that situation, agents naturally err on the side of classifying. But when
that evidence is then used to deprive an alien of his liberty, there is no requirement
that anyone review the classification decision. In other worns, no one asks whether
the classification decision might come out differently when the interest on the other
side of the balance is not an abstract public right to know, but the very specific interest of a human being seeking to regain his liberty ..
This structural flaw can lead to years of wholly unnecessary detention. If Nasser
Ahmed had been provided at the outset of his detention with the information he was
ultimately given, he would have been able to put on his defense immediately, and
he would presumably have been released in short order. Instead, when he was initially detained he was told that nothing could be revealed about the secret evidence,
and the immigration authorities, denied any meaningful response from Ahmed, ordered his detention. Only after he had sat for years in prison diet the INS disclose
what could and should have been disclosed at the outset. Thus, here the overc1assification literally cost a man years of his life.
C. The INS Uses Secret Evidence Where it Ladt8 Statutory Authority to Do So
One of the most common uses of secret evidence by INS is to justifY detaining
an alien without bond while his deportation hearing is pending. This practice can
and has resulted in the detention of aliens for (ears without ever seeing the evidence against them, even where the only forma charge against them is that they
overstayed their visa. Yet there is n<J statutory authorit:, for this practice.
Congress has authorized the INS to use secret evid.:-nce in a variety of settings,
and H.R. 2121 seeks to repeal much of that authority. Thus, the INA today authorizes the use of secret evidence to deny various forms of relief from removal, to exclude certain aliens, and to deport "alien terrorists." But the only statutory authorization to use secret evidence to detain an individual while his deportation proceedings are pending is 8 U.s.C. § 1536(a)(2)(B) (1997), which applies only to "alien terrorists" under special deportation hearings held in the Alien Terrorist Removal
Court. The INS has never invoked the Alien Terrorist Removal Court procedures,
but nonetheless has repeatedly used secret evidence to detain aliens not in these
procedures, and not accused of bein¥ "alien terrorists."
D. INS Regulations Do Not Require That the Alien be Provided a Meaningful Declassified Summary of Secret Evidence
__
INS regulations permit the use of secret evidence without even providing a summary of the evidence to the alien. While the regulations state that a summary
should be provided when possible, there is no requirement that a summary be provided, or that the summary afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond.
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(16) (1996), 242.17(a), (c)(4)(iv)(1996); 8 CFR
§ 240. 11(c)(3)(iv) (1997). An alien may be told only that secret evidence shows that
he must be detained, without even a hint as to what the evidence consists of or
charges him with. That is the situation Nasser Ahmed faced when he was initially
detained. The INS maintained that it could not tell him anything about the secret
evidence whatsoever. In such a situation, it is literally impossible to present a defense.
Where summaries are provided, there is no requirement that they be meaningful.
Thus, when Nasser Ahmed next faced secret evidence, in the course of his deportation hearing, the INS did give him a summary. But the summary consisted solely
of the allegation that he had an "association with a known terrorist organization."
Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immir:ration Judge 20 (May 5, 1997) The
INS would not even disclose the name of the group. The immigration judge correctly
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characterized that summary as "largely uselesst" id., but the regulations imPQBe no
requirement that the summaries meet any stanaard whatsoever.
.
. The use. o~ se.cret evidence virtually always makes a meaningful defense imposslble, but lt mdlsputably does so where the government does not give the alien notice of the specific allegations af,fainst him. Yet in none of the cases in which I have
been mvolved has the INS proVlded an adequate summary, and there is no regulation or requirement in place to ensure that it do so.
E. The INS Has Failed to Keep Recordll of Its Secret Evidence Presentations Thereby
Defeating Meaningful Review
'
I?nally, the INS has failed t? keep records of many of its secret evidence presentabons. In Ahmed's and AI NalJar's cases, the immigration judges initially took evidence in camera but made no record of the hearing. The absence of a record. of
course, defeats any semblance of meaningful appellate review, particularly where
the hearing was never open to the public 80 there is no check on government assertions regarding what transpired. In these cases, the Board of Immigration Appeals,
an appellate body, took new evidence outside the record and again ex parte and in
camera, and based its decisions on that extra-record showing.
III. SECRET PROCEDURES ENCOURAGE RELIANCE ON QUESTIONABLE EVIDENCE

In open proceedings, each party's knowlodge that its evidence will be subjected
to cross-examination and rebuttal by its adversary creates crucial incentives. It
means that any ~ood advocate will test his or her evidence first, betore it is subj~ted to testing m open court, and will n.ot rely on weak or questionable evidence.
When one knows, by contrast, that the other side will never see the evidence, those
checkl! do not operate. The INS's track record illustrates that secret procedures invite abuse.
First, the INS has relied heavily in its secret evidence presentations on hearsay,
often in the form of reports drafted by FBI agents relaying accusations by hearsay
sources. In the cases of Nasser Ahmed and Hany Kiareldeen the immigration
judges harshly criticized the government for its reliance on doubie and triple hearsay, its failure to provide sufficient information to permit an independent assessment of the allegatIOns, and its failure, when questioned by the immigration judges,
to produce any first-hand witnesses. In effect, it appears that the government
sought to have the immigration judges simply defer to the judgment of its FBI witness that the alien posed a threat to national security.
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have held that relianre on hearsay
in immigration proceedings~ while not absolutely prohibited, poses serious due process.problems because it deteats the possibility of examining the witnesses. Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.9
(1974) (describing Bridges as holding that due process bars use of hearsay "as substantive evidence bearing on. . . A charge upon which a deportation order had been
based"). Thus, many courts hold that the INS may not present hearsay unless it
first shows that the ori~nal declarant is unavailable. See, e.g., Cunanan v. INS, 856
F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Crr. 1988); Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (5th Cir.
1992); Dallo v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1985); Kiareldeen, 1999 WL 956289,
at *14-*18. Yet the INS relies heavily on hearsay in its secret evidence hearings,
and as far as I know, has never made a showing that the original declarants are
unavailable. The presentation of evidence in secret makes it impossible for the alien
to cross-examine the witnesses against him. When the secret evidence consists of
hearsay. it is impossible even for the judge to question the sources.
Second~r~he INS has relied on extremely weak evidence in its secret presentations.
In Hany ruareldeen's case, it appears to have relied principally on accusations made
by Kiareldeen's ex-wife, who was in a custody dispute with Kiareldeen and had
made repeated false accusations against him. Its evidence alleged that Kiareldeen
had hosted a meeting at his Nutley, New Jersey apartment a year and a half before
he even moved into the apartment.
In Nasser Allmed's case, the FBI initially claimed in its secret evidence that
Ahmed had disseminated to the press a letter from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman,
who was then in prison, to the press. The letter complained of the Sheikh's prison
conditions, but called for no violence. The FBI claimed in its secret evidence presentation that the letter had nonetheless sparked a terrorist bombing in Egypt. Allmed
denied disseminating the letter, and proved that many other persons could have
done so. The FBI subsequently admitted that it had no idea who had disseminated
the letter, and the State Department reported that the terrorist incident had nothing to do with the Sheikh, but was a retaliatory attack for an Israeli bombing in
Southern Lebanon. Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immigration Judge
and Declassified Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999). In Allmed's
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case, the FBI agent also argued in secret hearings that Ahmed should be detained
because the INS's detention of him had increased his stature in the Arab community, and that as a result upon his release he would be a more effective leader. 1d.
Finally, some of the secret evidence in Ahmed's case may have come from the E~
tian government, the very country that the immigration judge found would impnson
and likely torture Ahmed for his affiliations with Sheikh Abdel Rahman if Ahmed
were returned there. 1d.
These examples illustrate that one cannot short-circuit the adversary process
without substantial costs, not only to the rights of those against secret evidence is
used, but to the legitimacy of the truth-finding process itself.
IV. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS UNNECESSARY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

-

The government typically responds to the above concerns by claiming that the
government's interest in national security, coupled with the pohtical branches' "plenary power" over immigration matters, nonetheless justifies the use of secret evidence. But there has never been any showing that national security in fact requires
the use of secret evidence, and the government's track record strongly suggests that
its identification of "national security" concerns is by no means trustworthy.
As I noted at the outset, I have represented 13 aliens against whom the INS
sought to use secret evidence. In all 13 cases, the INS claimed that national security
would be threatened. In 12 of the 13 cases, the aliens are now living freely in the
United States, after the INS lost in court and then decided not to pursue avenues
of appeal available to it. The very fact that in these cases the INS did not even pursue all of their appeals~ only underscores the weakness of the national security
claim. If national security were genuinely at risk, one would expect the government
to leave no stone unturned in its attempt to safeguard the nation.
Even where national security concerns are bona fide, the use of secret evidence
to deprive an alien of his liberty is unconstitutional. It is indisputable that secret
evidence could never be used in a criminal case, whether the crime charged was espionage, sabotage, or terrorism, and no matter how serious the national security
concern. We have survived as a nation for over 200 years despite our adherence to
that absolute principle. There is no reason to believe that adoption of a similar practice in deportation cases would pose any greater threat.
The Supreme Court has made clear that it will not countenance the use of secret
evidence, even where claims of national security are advanced, to deprive aliens living here of their liberty. It refused to permit secret evidence in Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, even though the Attorney General had personally determined that the
information could not be disclosed without prejudicing the national interest. 344
U.S. at 592. When faced with INS claims that labor organizer Harry Bridges's continued residence here was contrary to national security due to his associations with
the Communist Party, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that hearsay could not
be used to establish deportability because he must be afforded the opportunity to
confront the evidence against him. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152, 156 (1945).8
As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[tlhe requirement of 'due process' is nota fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble." Joint Anti·Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 162.
Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive, even as a tool for fighting
terrorism. It makes error all too likely, meaning that we may well focus on the
wrong people. And more fundamentally, secrecy encourages distrust of government.
And that distrust can itself impede law enforcement. Many aliens in Arab communities are deeply suspicious of federal agents now, and for good reason. Nearly all
of the secret evidence cases of the past five years have involved Arab and/or Muslim
aliens. If we believe that the Arab community is more likely to contain terrorists,
a supposition that as Timothy McVeigh showed, is debatable, the last thing we
should do is adopt tactics that make the entire community view law enforcement
as the enemy.

v.

H.R. 2121 RESPONDS TO THE ABOVE CONCERNS BY REPEALING STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO USE SECRET EVlDENCE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE ADJUDICATION
OF IMMIGRATION BENEFITS

H.R. 2121 provides a direct and straightforward remedy to all of the above problems. It repeals statutory authority for the use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings and the adjudication of immigration benefits. If enacted, it would accord
8 In enacting the deportation provision at issue in Bridges, Congress specifically found that
the Communist Party posed a threat to national security. S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong.• 2d Sess.
788-89(950).
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to all aliens the fair procedures now provided to most. Because the use of secret evidence is unconstitutional, unworkable, and unwise, I fully support this remedy.
First, it would repeal authority for using secret evidence to deport aliens. That
!lu~horio/ has .only existed since 1.996, !lnd ha~ nev~r bee~ ~nvoked by the INS, so
It IS qwte plam that we can SUl"Vlve WIthout It. This proVlsion would simply place
all aliens living here on equal footing in removal hearings.
Second, it would repeal authority for the government to deny immigration benefits
based on secret evidence. Currently, the INA authorizes the government to deny
even asylum on the basis of secret evidence. In Nasser Ahmed's case, the immigration judge initially found that although Nasser Ahmed had shown his eligibility for
asylum on the public record, because he would be imprisoned and very likely tortured if returned to Egypt, his application had to be denied based on secret evidence
that Ahmed never saw.
,
Third, the bill would make clear that aliens may not be detained on the basis of
secret evidence while their removal proceedings are pending. As noted above, there
is no existing affirmative statutory authority for this practice under current law outside the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, but the INS maintains that it has the authority implicitly, and therefore it is wise to make clear that no such authority exists.
Fourth, the bill would bar the government from using secret evidence to deny admission to returning permanent resident aliens individuals paroled into the United
St.ates, and asylum seekers at the border. The loar on use against returning ~erma
nent residents is already supported by Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C.
1992). Persons paroled into the Uhited States and asylum seekers under current law
lack constitutional protection, but the use of secret evidence in these cases presents
all the same problems that its use presents in proceedings against aliens who have
entered the country, and accordingly I support this reform as well.
_
CONCLUSION

The defects of legal proceedings conducted in secret have been recognized for cen-turies. In the Bible itself provided that under Roman law, a man charged with
criminal conduct should "have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer
for himself concerning the crime laid a?,'ainst him."9 Similarly, Wigmore, the noted
expert on evidence, has written that '[flor two centuries past, the policy of the
Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law." 10 It would be difficult to identitY
anything more as fundamental to a fair legal process than the right of each party
to examine and confront th.e evidence against it. When we deny that right to aliens,
we not only denigrate their rights, but demean our own system of justice.

Mr. SMITH. Thank. you, Professor Cole.
Mrs: AI-Arian.
STATEMENT OF NAHLAAL-ARIAN

Mrs. AL-ARIAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, thanks, Ms. Jackson Lee
for inviting me today to talk about this very much needed issue
and the secret evidence procedure.
My name is Nahla AI-Arian, and I am a proud American citizen
of Palestinian descent. I am also a mother of five, and the proud
.sister of Dr. Mazen AI-Najjar, who's been deprived of his freedom
for almost 1,000 days now because of the use of secret evidence. On
May 19th, 1997, Mazen was handcuffed in front of his three young
daughters and taken to a detention facility for supposedly a visa
violation. We thought that he would be released on bail in a day
or two, like thousands of many similar cases.
However, our hopes were quickly dashed when the Government
used secret evidence against him. The immigration judge in the
hearing said that my brother is respectable socially, religiously and
professionally and has strong family and community ties. He then
(King James).

9 Acts 25:16
10 5 Wigmore

(1959».

on EvUknce 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (quoted in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497

